Securitization of Politics and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Experience by Okolie, Aloysius-Michaels & Ugwueze, Michael Ikechukwu
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.36, 2015 
 
28 
Securitization of Politics and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko 
Haram Experience 
 
Aloysius-Michaels Okolie Ph.D 
Professor of Political Science,  Department of Political Science,   University of Nigeria, Nsukka 
 
Michael Ikechukwu Ugwueze 
Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka 
 
Abstract 
Security is one of the cardinal projects necessary for engendering an organized society and everybody is a 
critical stakeholder. However, it appears that this project has been politicized in Nigeria and the politicization 
has led to sporadic emergence of injurious ethnic militias who have equally become tools in the hands of the 
political elite group for achieving what was impossible at the polls. The study used Boko Haram insurgence to 
problematize the politics of securitization and relying on extracted axioms from the Marxian theory of social 
production and reproduction, the work discovered that the quest for primitive accumulation arising from the use 
of state power by the political elite group is responsible for the politicization of security in Nigeria. Among 
others, the study recommended that as a practical step to reduce securitization, good governance rooted in the 
will of the governed should be institutionalized. 
Keywords: security, securitization, politics, Boko Haram. 
 
♦ Introduction 
Man, as a social being with innate clashing and splashing interests, naturally seeks to institute a social order 
where the security of lives and properties would be safeguarded, guaranteed and propagated. Therefore, in the 
state of nature, the desire of man to protect his private property weaved around the ‘needs of the stomach’ 
compelled him to surrender his rights of arbitrariness and to enhance the enthronement of distinct civil societies 
whose primary concern was to institute social order where rights to properties, rights to life and rights to 
existence would be guaranteed and enforced by the state. As man traverses through different socio-formations, 
his ideas, experiences, internal and external stimuli, as well as his motivations, propensities and predispositions 
compelled him to modify his sense of security and adjust to new and emerging security trends and challenges. 
Nonetheless, it is important to amplify that the nature, dimensions and intensity of security threats 
witnessed in a given polity is inversely proportional to the nature, character and system of production and 
distribution of material values. Thus, the level of development of the productive forces finds its expression in the 
acculturation pattern, as well as in the system of politicking and allocation of socially produced common wealth. 
As a corollary of the above, in a polity, such as Nigeria, where distribution is amplified; where 
production is de-emphasized; where comprador instincts and residues predominate; where centrifugal tendencies 
are becoming more elastic; where ethno-regional conflicts are normative; and where struggle among the 
economic notables and political gladiators for crass appropriation of public wealth has been given extreme 
religious and regional leverage, the resultant effects are politicization of security and indeed the securitization of 
politics. 
In this paper, we shall, among others, explore the nexus and implications of the politics of securitization 
and the securitization of politics on Nigerian polity. We shall use the experience of the rampaging Boko Haram 
insurgency to interrogate the problematic. Issues explored include: theoretical perspective; explanatory matrix on 
security; securitization; remote, immediate and proximate causes of insecurity, as well as empirical analysis of 
securitisation and Boko Haram insurgency. 
 
♦ Theoretical Perspective 
The theoretical propositions adopted in this study were extracts and axioms derived from the Marxian analysis of 
social production and reproduction theory. These are nonetheless akin to what Marxian scholarship refers to as 
socio-economic system (Abalkin, Dzarasov and Kulijov, 1983). Meanwhile, Marx (1976) noted that the 
production of surplus value is the framework for analyzing the dynamism of the capitalist society.  
Hence the basic propositions of this theory is that the fundamental interest of man (all living things) is 
security and survival; thus in order to survive or be secured, man must produce and reproduce himself. This 
social production and reproduction give character to other human values; the social activities are in part or full 
related to pains, pleasure, security, violence, development, underdevelopment, poverty, riches etc. What can be 
produced is based on a combination of the quality of labour, non-human physical resources and interpersonal 
relations, and in every social production process, there must be someone or group of people that make binding 
decisions; those who make decisions also use it to their advantage. Every man struggles to remain in a 
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favourable position in social production and reproduction process and those who are satisfied with the 
production system struggle to retain the system while those that are not satisfied struggle to alter the status quo. 
Notably, capitalist system of social production, distribution and exchange dominates the global 
economy generating its conflicts and poverty because only a few controls the production process leaving out the 
majority of the working people poor unlike the pre-capitalist communal system of production where the majority 
controlled the production process. Although capitalism has generated great wealth and knowledge unlike any 
other system of social production hitherto known to man, it has also generated greater disparity, inequality, 
human suffering and misery as wealth and power are increasingly privatized and the gap between the ‘haves’ and 
the ‘have-nots’ has indeed reached the elastic limit.  Thus, Ogban- Iyam (2005:45) remarks that: 
The current challenge to any modern polity is how to (1) adapt communal society production to the 
current large scale societies or polities or (2) how to transform a capitalist social labour  to social 
products and no longer  private product in which a majority rules or (3) to transform a socialist 
production system  to a communal social production system in which a majority rules or (4) how to 
carry out a combination of 1 and 3 above where the majority are recessive and dominated by 
communal social production and minority of its citizens capitalist social production system 
The above quotation suggests that Nigeria is most fitted for the fourth category where both the 
communalism and capitalism are rife. In Nigeria, capitalism is dominant though not deeply rooted and popular 
but communalism tainted in feudalistic practices is dominating and deep rooted.  
Based on the foregoing, we state as follows: 
• Rival groups namely – communalists and capitalist are continuously struggling to capture, control and 
dominate the Nigerian economy. 
• Nigerian state is in a permanent status of economic disequilibrium arising largely from low production 
of material values and pursuit of policies aimed at instituting beggar mentality, hopelessness and 
stunted political imbecility. 
• Arising from the above, cultural secularisation is deliberately disjointed and tainted with intolerance 
and fear complex; this is largely because specific critical cultural values are deployed as tools for 
perpetrating grandiose personal and group appropriation. 
• As a corollary, social atomization is regimented and atomized towards extensive selfish ends. This 
truncates efforts at national consciousness and lives the political economy within the throes of constant 
protection of ethnic/clannish identities. 
• This struggle between these groups breeds policy inconsistencies and discourages diversification of the 
economy 
• That low intensity of social production and reproduction, low material and mental capacity of the 
leadership impel them to rely on received and prepared development agenda which they are equally 
incompetent to understand, interpret and implement. 
• The existence of uncoordinated and inchoate economic structure is implicated in the persistence of 
over-bloated state structure which, in the midst of disjointed economic structure, rather serves as 
vehicle for advancing political patronage and re-cycling of loyal but criminally-minded political 
surrogates; whose preoccupation is idleness and thuggery. 
• The existence of low productive potentials and competitiveness in the midst of liberalization project 
undermines the development of potent internal markets and thus enhances the emergence of a group of 
individuals who reify the State and market, alienates others in the decision making and implementation 
and hence see the political economy as their “self-serving shops and supermarkets.” 
The above factors combine to unleash Nigerian model of fascism characterised by blind pursuit of 
wealth by the few. The prevailing agony, poverty, malnutrition, malnourishment, alienation and suffocation 
generate reactionary and rebellious counter-reactions as seen in the unprecedented crimes and in the emergence 
of insurgents, such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND), Movement for the Actualization 
of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Odua People’s Congress (OPC), EGBESU and the Boko Haram. 
 
♦ Security Explained  
Security has to do with freedom from danger or with threats to a nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, 
promote its cherished values and legitimate interests and enhance the well being of its people. Thus internal 
security could be seen as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal 
cohesion and the corporate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the 
promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as meet the legitimate 
aspirations of the people. Internal security also implies freedom from danger to life and prosperity        
(Imobighe cited in Oche, 2004:76-77). 
Accordingly, Buzan (1991) analysed security from three levels. These include individuals, states and 
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international systems. The sectors, which he also addresses in the article “New Patterns of Global Security in the 
Twenty-First Century”, are Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental. These concepts cannot 
adequately address the issue of security separately, each one is intricately and complexly linked with the next 
forming a web of information that a security analyst or international relationist must detangle to understand each 
concept individually in order to ascertain how they affect each other on the whole. 
 Meanwhile, Security in social sciences parlance is conduced into principal ordinary meanings as 
follows: 
a) The condition of being safe; 
b) A financial pledge which is at the same time a form of investment. 
 Technically speaking, security is a direct synonym to safety. It signifies absence of, or protection from, 
physical danger. As noted by Lerner (1964:626): 
Security is sometimes used in such phrases as state security, security risk, security police, etc, to 
denote (a) the safety or protection, and/or (b) the agencies to  which the safety of the state is 
entrusted … In a larger sense, security is virtually identical with welfare and signifies absence of, or 
protection from, material want. 
The above postulations indicate, inter alia, that security is multifaceted and multidimensional in 
meaning, applications and projections. As a consequence of the foregoing, Luckham (2012:2) observes that: 
Security is not only multi-headed, but also morally ambiguous and politically contested. Everything 
depends on who speaks in the name of security. Whose security are we talking about? From what are 
they secured? And how is their security protected (or neglected)?  
Meanwhile, the moral and political confusion weaved around security stems from two different 
perspectives on the theory and practice of security itself. Indeed two perspectives on security: Security as order 
vs. Security as an entitlement dominates the literature. On one side, security involves ‘seeing like a state,’ even 
in a modern world where ‘the state’ comprises global and national power structures as well as nation states. The 
state based perspective on security sees it as a process of social and political ordering. 
This order is achieved through military power, surveillance or the control of new media. Post-conflict 
‘stabilization’ and ‘state-building’ in countries like Sierra Leone or Afghanistan has been premised upon the 
creation of political order so that development can take place. Another perspective conceives security, in terms 
of entitlement of citizens (2011 World Development Report’s formulation of citizen security, the UN’s 
endorsement of human security and the ‘responsibility to protect’). However, the two perspectives on security 
are mutually interconnected faces of governance. Both address the problems of power and the use of force, but 
from different directions.  
In practical term, security encompasses, but it is not limited to the following: 
♦ Freedom from hunger, want, starvation and diseases; 
♦ Conviction that the ‘needs of the stomach’ are safeguarded and guaranteed; 
♦ Mustering of adequate security machinery in a given polity to protect the lives, property and investments of the 
citizens; 
♦ guaranteeing the future of the people through responsible and responsive governance; 
♦ instituting adequate safeguards against oppression, suppression and alienation of the mass of the citizens 
♦ evolving political actions that will deepen affective, ascriptive and evaluative orientations among the citizens;  
♦ implanting statecraft based on effective production and equitable distribution of socially produced wealth; and  
♦ improving the residues of patriotism, solidarity and cooperative behaviour (Okolie, 2012:7-9). 
Indeed much of the principles enunciated above cohere with Luckham’s assertion and prescriptions on 
security. According to him, accounting for security from below is a priority for two reasons: 
-It reveals the agency of people who are insecure, including their survival strategies and their capacity to 
challenge dominant social orders, as has been seen in the Arab Springs. 
-It helps us understand the complex local contexts where vulnerable people seek security. In these contexts, state 
security agencies can easily become oppressors. Ordinary people may well seek protection elsewhere, even from 
otherwise malign and violent bodies such as paramilitaries and criminal mafias (Luckham, 2012:2). 
In its pure political connotation, especially as it concerns most states in Africa, security can aptly be 
conceived within the intellectual purview of the Copenhagen School. They remarked as follows: 
Security is not a fixed unit but it is created through a process of securitization. In other words, 
politicians can turn a political issue from a non-security related problem into a security problem by 
confronting it with an external threat. In a mere “speech act”, they can construct a common enemy 
and thus inspire their subjects to more closely identify with each other. For Karyotis, in the particular 
depiction of immigrants as ‘the others’, politicians engage securitization to firstly maintain “culture 
and identity” of their electorates, secondly prevent economic destabilization through massive 
immigration and thirdly “safeguard their [own] legitimacy and increase their electoral power”. Thus 
the security question is institutionalized and can be evoked where it promises political advantages 
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(Van Munster, 2013:3, 9-11). 
Much of the ascribed political advantages turn out to conduce into advancement of personal interests of 
few political gladiators; who, in pursuit of economic advantages resort to securitization. 
 
♦ Securitization: Conceptual Analysis 
Securitization, as a concept, originated from the writing of Ole Waever (1995), ... holds that some 
things do not really exist in hardened, maternal reality, but only exist as social constructs in peoples’ 
minds because people tacitly agree to act as if something existed (Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopaedia). 
In consonance with the above reasoning, the Wikipedia, the online free encyclopaedia noted that 
securitization describes the process of real-life actors “interpreting” and re-interpreting” things so that some 
audience become convinced in a particular context, that what was once a non-security problem must now 
become a security problem. Thus, according to Taureck (2006: 3), ‘security is a (illocutionary) speech act that 
solely by uttering ‘security’ something is being done. It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes 
one (Waever, 2004:13). By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing 
actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object’s survival. Taureck noted therefore 
that the issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it 
can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy making. For 
security, this means that it no longer has any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be anything a 
securitizing actor says it is.  
According to Taureck (2006:3), to prevent ‘everything’ from becoming a security issue, a successful 
securitization consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential threats; (2) emergency action; 
and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan et al, 1998: 6). To present an issue as an 
existential threat is to say that: ‘If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we 
will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). This first step 
towards a successful securitization is called a securitizing move. A securitizing move is in theory an option open 
to any unit because only once an actor has convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its legitimate need to 
go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations (emergency mode) can we identify a case of securitization. In 
practice, securitization is thus far from being open to all units and their respective subjective threats. Rather, it is 
largely based on power and capability and therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat. 
In her remark, and in consonance with the views expressed by Huysmans, Aradau criticized the 
moral/ethical dimension in the process of securitization. She argued as follows: 
[securitization] is: a technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent 
death by a mythical replay of the variations of the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a sudden 
rupture in the routinized, everyday life by fabricating an existential threat which provokes experiences 
of the real possibility of violent death (Aradau 2001).  
Therefore, securitization is not just a call for political or moral priority but if need be, for permission to 
break the normal rules of politics, i.e. by using force, by taking executive powers, or by imposing secrecy 
(Adiong, 2009:5). Again, Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (2006:23) added that it is when the move that takes 
politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as 
above politics and may refer to the classification of and consensus about certain phenomena, persons or entities 
as existential threats requiring emergency measures. 
Adiong (2009:6) further noted that the proponents explain that securitization is mostly about calls for 
closure against things perceived as existentially threatening and further, the consensual establishment of threat 
needs to be sufficient so as to produce substantial political effects. The constructionist school remarked that what 
constitutes an existential threat depends on a shared understanding of what is meant by such a danger to security. 
They classified threat into three as follows: 
• Actual threats are existential conditions that can, at any moment, reduce security. 
• Potential threats are conditions tending to reduce security but will not transformable to actual threats 
due to some constraints. 
• Fictitious threats are conditions that are perceived to reduce security but do not really exist. 
Arising from the foregoing, Adiong (2009:6-8) noted that securitization is the successful process of 
labelling an issue a security issue and results in the transformation of the way of dealing with it. This 
transformation has relevant implications; through the label “security” problems are turned into existential threats 
that require exceptional, emergency measures, which may include breaking otherwise binding rules or governing 
by decrees rather than by democratic decisions. Thus, Haacke (2007: 3) simply stated that to securitize an issue 
is to present as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of 
politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues. 
Meanwhile, Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (2006:23-24), outlined five key terminologies in the 
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process of securitization which was presented by Copenhagen School for security studies, namely: security, 
securitizing actors, referent objects, specific audience, and the speech act. 
. Security: A socially constructed concept about survival wherein an issue is presented as posing an existential 
threat to a designated object. It is securitized when articulated by a securitizing actor.  
. Securitizing Actors: These are actors in governments, international organizations or civil societies that 
securitize an issue by articulating the existence of threat(s) to the survival of specific referent object. 
. Referent Objects: These can be individuals and groups (refugees, victims of human rights abuses, etc.) as well 
as security issues like states (military security), national sovereignty or an ideology (political security), national 
economies (economic security), collective identities (societal security), or species or habitats (environmental 
security) that possess a “legitimate” claim to survival and whose existence is ostensibly threatened. 
. Specific Audience: The act of securitization is only successful and complete once the securitizing actor 
succeeds in using the language of security which is the “speech act” to convince a specific or significant 
audience e.g. public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, etc. that a referent object(s) is/are 
existentially threatened. 
. Speech Act: This is an important part in the process of securitization. According to Wæver (1998), with the 
help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a 
sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done. Through 
this process, two things become very clear. First, the word "security" is the act and second, the utterance is the 
primary reality.  
Arising from the foregoing discussion, we state as follows: 
• Labelling a given object, subject or action as being securitized does not necessarily mean that the 
subject is of objective essence for the survival of a given state. 
• Through the use of security acts, anybody can succeed in branding or constructing something as an 
existential problem. 
• The success and ability to effectively securitize a given object is highly dependent on both the status of 
a given actor, and of course, on whether similar issues are generally perceived. 
• If a subject is successfully securitized, then it is possible to legitimize extraordinary means to solve a 
perceived problem. These may range from declaring a state of emergency or martial law, mobilizing the 
military or attacking another country. 
• Again, if something is successfully labelled as a security problem, then the subject can be considered to 
be an illegitimate subject for political or academic debate (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia). 
• Labelling power shift to the ‘south’ was securitized and hence the referents (‘northern elements’) were 
indoctrinated and mobilised through taking up arms in the branded guise of Boko Haram. 
• Again, accepting the insurgency as securitization issue of concern empowered the leadership to adopt 
extraordinary means (state of emergency) to deal with the situation. 
It is, nonetheless, important to note that securitization could take place in any of these five political sectors: 
• Military 
• Political 
• Economic 
• Society 
• Environment 
However, a securitization could easily involve more than one of these sectors. In the case of the 2003 
Invasion of Iraq, one could state that the conflict was securitized militarily; weapons of mass destruction were 
one reason for the invasion. However, the war was also securitized as a societal problem; human rights in 
Saddam's Iraq were mentioned in the public rationale. Another less obvious example would be the immigration 
debate in the United States. Concerns of terrorist infiltration are regularly cited as grounds for home land 
security measures which led to the adoption of the tight control of borders. Because it is easier to securitize an 
issue following September 11, this concern for safety and security has taken attention away from the economic 
factors that have always been at play in international migration. 
In Nigeria, the restiveness in the Niger Delta was securitized by consolidation of all these factors listed 
above. The invasion of Odi by the Obasanjo’s administration was securitized on military and political 
considerations. The constant attacks on the leadership of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign 
State of Biafra (MASSOB) were securitized on essentially military and political considerations. The issue of 
Boko Haram terrorism is being securitized on the consideration of all the five factors listed above. 
In line with foregoing, Buzan et al (1998:25) opined that: 
Securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. 
Securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary means in the 
name of security. For the securitizing act to be successful, it must be accepted by the audience. 
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Securitization studies aims to understand "who securitizes (Securitizing actor), on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions." 
The term was coined by Ole Wæver in 1995, but seems to have become commonplace, at least within 
constructivist studies of international relations (Buzan, Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, 1998:25). 
The above citation is very instructive and insightful. Among others, it outlined the basic elements of 
securitization, unfolded its processes and as well highlighted the critical factors that incubate security threats in 
Nigeria. Meanwhile, security remains the epicentre upon which the core, middle range and routine values of 
polity are built. As a process with hydra-headed and sometimes monstrous and vacillating character, security 
remains basically the telos of man. The gregarious nature of man necessarily presents conditions for security and 
insecurity in human societies. 
Remote, Immediate and Proximate Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria 
Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor-Robaro (2013:80-83) outlined the remote, immediate and proximate 
causes of insecurity in Nigeria to include the following: 
a.  Remote Factors 
• Pervasive material inequalities and unfairness 
• Ethno-regional conflicts 
• Conflict perceptions between the public and government 
• Weak security system 
• Loss of socio-cultural and communal value system 
 
b. Immediate and Proximate Factors 
• Porous borders 
• Rural-urban drift 
• Social irresponsibility of companies 
• Unemployment/poverty 
• Terrorism  
In addition to the above, and depending on the prism one views it, insecurity in Nigeria can also be 
situated within the character of the political elites that control the state power and the quest to use such power for 
material accumulation; in doing so, anything goes including formation and empowering of ethnic militias (by 
politicians) who ipso facto would be the vanguard for actualizing what was impossible in a civilized process 
through a backdoor act. Against this backdrop, Onaiyekan (2012) noted that: 
In Nigeria’s ‘winner takes all’ political culture, where the country’s political elites from a number 
of regions, religions and ethnicities compete for power  and the control of oil resources, militant 
groups (like Boko Haram) serve as a kind of pressuring mechanism for achieving what cannot be 
achieved in elections, in parliament, or in backroom deals (cited in Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014:24) 
Germane as the above are, existing scholarship appears to gloss over the fundamental and recurring 
factors rooted in the securitization of politics and innate politics that trail the management of such security 
threats. Indeed politicization and/or securitization of the process of managing these potential and actual threats 
stimulated the escalation of the Boko Haram terrorist acts. The situation becomes worse given the impunity that 
characterizes the Nigerian political culture. 
 
Securitization and Boko Haram Insurgency 
The preceding analyses are germane and clearly linked securitization to Boko Haram insurgency. However, prior 
to the Boko Haram threat, several issues had been securitized as security situation in Nigeria continued to 
deteriorate. The perceived marginalization of the South-East geopolitical zone was securitized, as MASSOB 
became potent security threat. Again, the South-West geopolitical zone is equally nursing the feeling of unfair 
treatment. Hence the militant wing of Odua People’s Congress (OPC) had been on the prowl. Also, following the 
annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election believed to have been won by late Chief MKO Abiola, the 
Yoruba political elites used the umbrella of NADECO to unleash unmitigated attacks on the military junta led by 
late General Sani Abacha. The State was heavily challenged as the survival of the Nigerian State hanged in 
symphony. 
 In addition, the obvious alienation, neglect and pauperisation of oil bearing communities in the Niger 
Delta region threw up counter-revolutionary forces championed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND). The issue was securitized and the Nigerian State explored extraordinary means to tackle 
the grievances. 
 However, the poor or inept handling of most of these security threats unleashed further criminal acts 
and exacerbated the level of crime in the polity. See Table 1 below for presentation of level of crime from 2000 
to 2008. 
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Table 1: Level of Crime from 2000 to 2008 
Year Theft Armed Robbery Kidnapping Assassination Fraud 
2000 29127 1877 243 1255 7927 
2001 40796 2809 349 2120 10234 
2002 35231 3889 337 2117 9134 
2003 33124 3497 410 2136 9508 
2004 37289 3142 349 2550 9532 
2005 46111 2074 798 2074 9580 
2006 41901 2863 372 2000 6395 
2007 21082 2327 277 2007 5860 
2008 23927 2340 309 1956 5058 
Total 308588 20929 3444 18215 73228 
Source: Summary of Available Crime Statistics in Nigeria (2003-2008) 
Culled from Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro (2013:84) 
Table 1 shows that from 2008, the rate of theft, armed robbery and kidnapping which reduced in 2007 
was on the rise again and as a confirmation of this, Ani (2009) equally observed that “the rate of theft, armed 
robbery especially in the banks, kidnapping and assassination has continued to rise especially in the southern part 
of the country” (cited in Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013:84) 
 Also, CLEEN Foundation (2012) in a survey of crime rate in Nigeria found that robbery rate has 
increased significantly in the past one year. Also the vandalization of business installations; in particular, those 
of GSM operators, has been on the increase. Research has indicated that these vices are not equally distributed in 
the country (CLEEN Foundation, 2012). For instance, the South East states of the country have the highest 
incidence of kidnapping, armed robbery and fraud while the northern states are characterized by bombing by the 
Islamic Sect, Boko Haram. With the incessant Boko Haram bombing of the northern part of the country, Nigeria 
indeed joined those isolated countries that carry that revolting tag of being referred to as terrorist states 
As a corollary of the above, the incessant attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents complicated the 
already worsened security situation in Nigeria and appear to push the polity unto the verge of precipice. See table 
2 below for global peace ranking of selected states in Africa. 
Table 2: Nigeria and other West African Countries on the Global Peace Index Ranking 
S/N Country GPI 
Score 
2009 
GPI 
Rank 
2009 
GPI 
Score 
2010 
GPI 
Rank 
2010 
GPI 
Score 
2011 
GPI 
Rank 
2011 
GPI 
Score 
2012 
GPI 
Rank 
2012 
1 Ghana 1.76 52 1.78 48 1.75 42 1.81 50 
2 Sierra Leone - - 1.82 53 1.90 61 1.86 52 
3 Burkina Faso 1.91 71 1.85 57 1.83 51 1.88 52 
4 Gambia - - - - 1.91 62 1.96 74 
5 Senegal 1.98 80 2.03 79 2.05 77 1.99 78 
6 Guinea - - - - 2.13 92 2.07 92 
7 Guinea Bissau - - - - - - 2.11 95 
8 Liberia - - 2.15 99 2.16 97 2.13 101 
9 Mali 2.09 96 2.24 109 2.19 100 2.13 102 
10 Benin - - - - - - 2.23 114 
11 Niger - - - - 2.36 119 2.24 116 
12 Mauritania 2.48 124 2.39 123 2.43 130 2.30 125 
13 Cote D’Ivoire 2.34 117 2.30 118 2.42 128 2.42 134 
14 Nigeria 2.60 129 2.76 137 2.74 142 2.80 146 
Source: Compiled from Global Peace Index (2009-2012). Culled from Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-
Robaro (2013:87) 
Statistics from table 2 above indicate that insecurity pervades Nigeria’s landscape. In fact between 2011 
and 2012 the country dropped four places to 146th out of 158 countries in the 2012 Global Peace Ranking. In 
fact, Nigeria has been identified as the least peaceful country in West Africa (GPI, 2012). Indeed, Igbuzor (2011) 
remarked that West Africa is among the most unsecured region in the world and Table 2 above indicates that 
Nigeria is the most unsecured country in the region as it has consistently ranked high among the countries in 
West Africa. On the contrary, Ghana, a neighbouring country to Nigeria has consistently ranked low and is taken 
as the most peaceful country in the region (Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013:87). 
We have to reiterate that there is a synergy between securitization of clannish/ethnic demands and the 
Boko Haram insurgence. Simply put, the blind, chaotic and unmitigated crave for power by few northern elites 
and their southern collaborators led to securitization of political transition; and hence informed the recruitment 
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and use of the Boko Haram insurgents to arm-twist the political leadership into abdicating their offices. Presently, 
Nigeria appears to be at war herself as statistics in tables 3-5 below demonstrate. 
Table 3: Some Instances of Boko Haram Attacks and casualty statistics in Nigeria between 2009 and 2010 
S/N Date Nature and Place of Attack Number of Casualties 
1 26th July, 2009 First clash with the security agencies in Bauchi state after 
an all night attack on Dutsen-Tanship police station 
42 people killed including 39 sect 
members, 2 policemen and 1 soldier 
2 27th July, 2009 First attack in Yobe state during an invasion in Potiskum 
Divisional Police Headquarters 
4 killed including 3 policemen and 1 
fire service officer  
3 29th July, 2009 Confrontation with security men at Mamudo village, along 
Potiskum/Damaturu Road, Yobe state 
33 members of the sect killed 
4 29th July, 2009 An all-night battle with combined security operatives at 
Railway Terminus, Maiduguri 
Unreported scores killed and 
operational base of the sect destroyed 
5 13th March, 
2010 
Attack in Northern part of Jos, Plateau state 300 people killed 
6 8th September, 
2010 
Attack at Bauchi Central Prison  No record of death but prisoners 
were freed 
7 24th Dec., 
2010 
Bomb explosion in Barkin Ladi, Jos, Plateau state 30 people killed 
8 31st Dec., 2010 Explosions at Mogadishu mammy market, Abuja About 10 people killed 
Source: Sani (2011: 17) “Boko Haram: History, Ideas and Revolt”, Journal of Constitutional Development. 11 
(4): 1-16 and Okpaga et al (2012: 86) “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”, Arabian 
Journal of Business and Management Review, 1 (9) 77-98 
 
Table 4: Some Instances of Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria between 2011 and 2013). 
S/N Date Nature and Place of Attack Number of Casualties 
1 28th Jan., 2011 Attack on the ANPP governorship candidate’s 
convoy at Lawan Bukar ward, Maiduguri 
7 people killed including the 
governorship candidate 
2 2nd Mar., 2011 Attack on DPO Mustapha Sandamu’s residence at 
Rigasa area of Kaduna state 
2 policemen killed 
3 30th Mar., 2011 Bomb explosion in Damaturu A policeman was injured 
4 2nd April, 2011 Bomb explosion at Dutsen-Tanship Police Station 2 policemen injured 
5 4th May, 2011 Attack at Maiduguri Prison on Kashim Ibrahim 
Way 
A prison warder was killed 
6 5th May, 2011 Attack in Maiduguri Government House 2 people killed including the Duty 
Officer and a 13-year-old boy with 
another injured 
7 9th May, 2011 Attack on the residences of 2 Islamic clerics, 
Sheikh Goni Tijani and Mallam Abur, at Mairi 
and Bulabulum Wards in Bauchi state 
The 2 Islamic clerics were killed 
8 9th May, 2011 Chairman of NURTW Bauchi state was attacked 1 person died – the  chairman 
9 13th May, 2011 Bomb explosion at London Chinki, Maiduguri 2 people killed 
10 15th May, 2011 Bomb explosion at Lagos Street, Maiduguri 5 people injured including 2 soldiers 
and 3 policemen. Also, a police man 
was shot dead same day in the city 
11 29th May, 2011 Bomb explosion in Bauchi military barrack 14 killed 
12 29th May, 2011 Bomb explosion at Zuba, a suburb of Kubwa in 
Abuja  
8 people lost their legs 
13 31st May, 2011 Attack on Shehu of Borno’s brother 1 person killed – the Shehu’s brother 
14 1st Jun., 2011 Attack on Police Station in Maiduguri 5 people killed 
15 12th Jun., 2011 Attack on a drinking joint in Bulumkutu, 
Maiduguri 
4 people killed 
16 16th Jun., 2011 Bomb explosion at Police Headquarters, Abuja. 
Also, 
bomb explosion at Damboa town, Maiduguri. 
2 people killed 
4 children killed 
17 20th Jun., 2011 Attack on Kankara Police Station in Katsina state 2 people killed 
18 9th July, 2011 Clash between Boko Haram and the military in 
Maiduguri. 
Also, bomb blast in a church at Suleja, Niger 
state 
31 people killed. 
4 died in that of Suleja with scores 
injured 
19 11th July, 2011 Bomb explosion at a relaxation joint in Fokados 
Street, Kaduna 
Unreported scores killed with many 
more injured 
20 12th July, 2011 Attack on a moving military patrol vehicle with 
IED in Maiduguri 
5 people killed 
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21 15th July, 2011 Bomb explosion in Maiduguri 5 people injured 
22 23rd July, 2011 Bomb explosion close to the Palace of the Shehu 
of Borno 
3 soldiers injured 
23 25th July, 2011  Bomb explosion near the palace of a traditional 
ruler in Maiduguri 
8 people killed 
24 26th Aug., 2011 Attack on the United Nations building in Abuja 25 people killed with about 60 more 
injured 
25 12th Sep., 2011 Bomb explosion in a Police Station in Misau, 
Bauchi state 
7 people killed including 4 policemen 
26 13th Sep., 2011 Attack on the military after a raid in Boko Haram 
hideouts in Bauchi state 
About 4 soldiers injured 
27 17th Sep., 2011 Attack on Mohammed Yusuf’s brother-in-law 
two days after playing host to Obasanjo 
1 person – Babakura Fugu – killed 
28 3rd Oct., 2011 Attack at Baga market in Maiduguri 3 people killed 
29 4th Nov., 2011 Attack in Damaturu, Yobe state About 150 people killed 
30 27th Nov., 2011 Attack in Geidaam, Yobe state 7 people killed 
Source: Sani (2011: 40-41) “Boko Haram: History, Ideas and Revolt”, Journal of Constitutional Development. 
11 (4): 1-16 and Okpaga et al (2012: 86-88) “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”, 
Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review. 1 (9): 77-98 
31 18th Dec., 2011 Bomb detonation in Shuwari, Maiduguri 3 sect members died 
32 22nd Dec., 2011 Bomb explosion and gunshots in Borno 
state 
4 people killed and several others injured 
33 24th Dec., 2011 Bomb explosion in Jos About 80 people killed 
34 25th Dec., 2011 Bomb explosion at St. Theresa’s 
Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger state 
About 50 people killed and several others 
injured 
35 30th Dec., 2011 Attack in Maiduguri 7 people killed 
36 5th Jan., 2012 Attack in a church in Gombe 6 people killed 
37 6th Jan., 2012 Attack in Christ Apostolic Church, Yola, 
Adamawa state. 
Also, attack at Mubi, Adamawa 
17 people killed. 
Also, 20 Igbo people were killed in Mubi 
38 20th Jan., 2012 Multiple attacks in Kano  About 250 people killed  
39 22nd Jan., 2012 Attacks at 2 churches and the 
headquarters of Tafawa Balewa LGA in 
Bauchi state 
About 10 people killed 
40 26th Jan., 2012 Bomb explosion in Sabon Gari, Kano 
state 
Many injured 
41 28th Jan., 2012 Attack in Gambiru Ngala, Borno state 1 killed 
42 29th Jan., 2012 Attack in Gambiru Ngala, Borno state 2 killed 
43 30th Jan., 2012 Attack in Maiduguri environs 6 killed including 2 Air force officers 
44 4th Feb., 2012 Attack in Damboa town, Borno state 2 killed 
45 5th Feb., 2012 Attack in Yobe An SS man killed 
46 7th Feb., 2012 Attack at Kano market and military 
barrack 
5 people killed 
47 7th Feb., 2012 Another attack in Kano 10 people killed 
48 10th Feb., 2012 Shootout with soldiers in Maiduguri 4 people killed 
49 10th Feb., 2012 Attack in Police Station in Shagari 
Quarters, Kano state 
No casualty recorded 
50 12th Feb., 2012 Tip-off in Maiduguri Some members of Boko Haram killed 
51 15th Feb., 2012 Jail break in Koton Karji prison, Kogi 
state 
A warder killed and 199 prisoners freed 
52 15th Feb., 2012 Attack on policemen in Minna, Niger 
state 
2 policemen killed 
53 17th Feb., 2012 Attack I Geidam, Yobe state 2 people killed 
54 17th Feb., 2012 Attack in Maiduguri metropolis 5 people killed 
55 19th Feb.,2012 Bomb explosion near a church in Suleja 
on the outskirt of Abuja  
5 people injured 
56 11th Mar., 2012 Suicide bomb attack in a church in Jos, 
Plateau state 
4 people killed and 38 others injured 
57 8th April, 2012 Bomb explosion on Easter Sunday near 
a church in Kaduna 
36 people killed with 13 others injured 
58 29th April, 2012 Bomb attack at a lecture theater used as 
Christian worship in the University of 
Kano 
19 people killed including 2 professors 
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59 3rd Jun., 2012 Suicide car bomber drove into a church 
in Yelwa during Sunday service  
About 12 people killed 
60 10th June, 2012 Attack on a church congregation in Biu 
town, Borno state 
Unreported number of people killed 
Source: Okpaga et al (2012: 88-89) “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity  
Question in Nigeria”, Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review. 1 (9): 77-98 
 and Vanguard December 1
st
, 2012 also retrievable from www.vanguardngr.com 
61 1st Oct., 2012 Attacks at Adamawa State University, Federal 
Poly, and the school of Health Technology and 
also University of Maiduguri in Borno state  
About 43 students killed 
61 1st Oct., 2012 Attack in Minna, Niger state 2 policemen killed 
63 7th Oct., 2012 Confrontation between the military and the sect 
members in Damaturu, Yobe state 
About 32 people killed including 
30 members of the sect and 2 
civilians 
64 8th Oct., 2012 Reprisal attack for the death of military officers 
through IED in Maiduguri 
10 people killed 
65 14th Oct., 2012 Attack at Dongo Dawa village in Gwari LGA of 
Kaduna state 
24 people killed 
66 28th Oct., 2012 Attack in Kaduna 8 people killed and 100 injured 
67 28th Oct., 2012 Suicide bomber struck at St Rita’s Catholic church 
in Angwar yero, Kaduna state 
8 people killed 
68 29th Oct., 2012 Attack at a drinking bar in Gindin Akwati Barkin 
Ladi, Plateau state 
6 people killed 
69 21st Nov., 2012 Attack in Maiduguri by the sect 10 people killed 
70 22nd Nov., 2012 Attack on ladies believed to be on mini-skirts in 
Maiduguri 
20 women killed 
71 24th Nov., 2012 Bomb explosion in St Andrew’s Anglican church 
at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College 
Jaji, Kaduna state 
15 people killed 
72 26th Nov., 2012 Attack on SARS headquarters in Abuja 2 officers killed and 30 detainees 
freed 
73 1st Jan., 2013 Shootout in Maiduguri 14 people killed including 13 
sect members and a soldier 
74 2nd Jan., 2013 Attack on a Police Station at Song town of 
Adamawa state 
4 people killed including 2 
policemen and 2 civilians 
75 4th Jan., 2013 Attack on a military check-point in Marte town of 
Adamawa state 
7 people killed including 5 sect 
members, a soldier and a 
policeman 
76 19th Jan., 2013 Attack on a contingent of Mali-bound Nigerian 
troops in central Kogi, Kogi state 
2 soldiers killed and 5 others 
injured 
77 19th Jan., 2013 Attack on Emir of Kano’s convoy 5 people killed mostly the 
Emir’s security guards 
78 21st Jan., 2013 Attack of a market in Damboa town 18 people killed mostly local 
hunters 
79 23rd Jan., 2013 Attack at Gwange area of Maiduguri 5 people beheaded 
80 27th Jan., 2013 Attack of Gajiganna village near Maiduguri 8 civilians killed 
81 1st Feb., 2013 Clash with the military in two forests outside 
Maiduguri 
17 sect members killed 
82 8th Feb., 2013 Attack on 2 polio clinics in Kano 10 polio immunization workers 
killed and 3 others injured 
83 10th Feb., 2013 Attack in Potiskum, Yobe state 3 North Korean doctors killed 
84 15th Feb., 2013 Bomb attack against military patrol vehicle in 
Maiduguri 
2 suicide bombers died and 1 
soldier injured 
85 16th Feb., 2013 Attack on a construction company in Bauchi state 1 security employee killed and 7 
foreign nationals abducted 
86 19th Feb., 2013 French family taken hostage in Cameroun near the 
Nigerian border 
No casualty reported but the 
family members were abducted 
87 20th Feb., 2013 Attack of a military patrol vehicle in Maiduguri 3 people killed including a 
suicide bomber and 2 civilians 
88 18th Mar., 2013 Bomb explosion in a luxurious bus park in Kano More than 70 people killed and 
several others injured 
89 16th April, 2013 Clash between the JTF and the sect members in 
Baga, Borno state 
Over 200 people killed mostly 
civilians 
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Source: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/timeline_of_Boko_Haram_attacks_in_Nigeria 
90 18/6/2013 Attack in Maiduguri 22 people mostly civilians 
were killed 
91 6/7/2013 Sporadic shooting and throwing of 
explosives  on government boarding school 
in Mamudo village Borno state 
At least 43 people were 
killed, mostly, students 
92 29/7/2013 Coordinated bomb blasts Sabon Gari, Kano 
state 
At least, 6 people died and 6 
others injured 
93 4/8/2013 Attacks at military base and police post in 
Bama, Borno state 
12 soldiers and 7 police 
officers were killed 
94 11/8/2013 Shoot-out  Ngom village near konduga in 
Borno state 
12 people were killed 
95 11/8/2013 Coordinated attacks including shooting and 
throwing explosives  Mosque in Konduga, 
Borno state 
44 worshippers killed and 26 
others injured 
 
Table 5: Some Cases of Boko Haram Attacks after Its Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by 
the US Government. 
S/N Date Nature and Place of Attack Number of Casualties 
1 28/11/2013 Attacks on residents of Sabon Gari village in Damboa District, 
Borno state 
More than 17 people were killed 
2 30/11/2013 Coordinated attacks at Baga in Ningi villages Scores of people were killed 
including 7 fishermen 
3 2/12/2013 Around 200 Boko Haram gunmen dressed in military uniform 
launched coordinated attacks on an air force base in Maiduguri 
Scores of people killed 
4 20/2/2014 Coordinated attacks at Bama More than 115 people killed 
5 22/2/2014 Coordinated attacks at Izge village More than 100 people were killed 
6 25/2/2014 Attacks on Federal Government Boarding School at Buni/Yadi About 59 people mostly students 
were killed 
7 15/3/2014 Boko Haram clash with the military at 21 Armoured Brigade, 
Nigerian Army, Borno 
More than 350 people were killed 
8 5/4/2014 Attacks on Buni/Gari village mosque More than 17 people were killed 
9 9/4/2014 Multiple attacks on Dikwa, Kala Balge, Gambulga and Gwoza 
villages in Borno 
More than 210 people killed 
10 14/04/2014 Bomb blast at Nyanya motor-park, Abuja More than 100 people killed and 
over 200 others badly injured 
11 15/04/2014 Attack at a Government Senior Secondary School, Chibok, 
Borno state 
Over 275 girls were said to have 
been abducted 
12 26/04/2014 Attack in military unit at Blabili, Dandoa, Borno state More than 44 people killed 
13 01/05/2014 Bomb explosion in a Taxi park at Nyanya, Abuja More than 25 people killed and 
above 71 others injured 
14 02/05/2014 Attack on commuters along Maiduguri-Beneshiek-Damaturu 
Road. 
 About 10 people killed 
15 05/05/2014 Boko Haram attack in Gamboru village, a border town with 
Cameroon 
About 300 hundred people killed 
and 11 girls abducted 
16 19/05/2014 Bomb explosion in Sabon Gari Kano Over 10 people killed and several 
others injured 
17 20/05/2014 Bomb blasts at Jos Terminus market, Plateau state About 150 people killed 
18 21/05/2014 Attack on Alagarno, a Village in Borno state close to Chibok About 17 people killed 
19 24/05/2014 Bomb explosion in Jos football viewing center Unspecified number of people 
killed 
20 28/05/2014 Attack by gunmen at Gurmushi, Borno state More than forty people killed 
21 2/06/2014 Bomb blast at a bar and a brothel in military base, Mubi, 
Adamawa state 
More than 60 people killed 
22 3/06/2014 Boko Haram attcks at Attagara, Agapalawa and Aganjara, 
Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno state 
More than 100 people were killed 
23 15/06/2014 Attack at Borno market More than 15 people were 
reportedly killed 
24 17/06/2014 Bomb blast at football viewing center at Damaturu, Yobe state About 21 killed and others 
seriously injured 
25 23/06/2014 Suicide bomb attack at Kano School of Hygiene Technology, 
Kano state 
About 8people killed and many 
others injured 
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26 25/06/2014 Bomb attack at a shopping mall in Abuja About 24 people killed and many 
others badly injured 
27 29/06/2014 Gunmen attack at some churches in Chibok community, Borno 
state 
Actual number of deaths yet to be 
unravelled 
28 14/07/2014 Attack in Borno About 26 people were killed 
29 23/07/2014 Boko Haram attack in Kaduna About 39 people were killed 
30 24/07/2014 Suicide bomb attack on Buhari’s convoy in Kaduna More than 82 people were 
reportedly killed 
31 31/07/2014 Boko Haram attacks in Yobe mosque and another female suicide 
bomb attacks in Kano 
About 18 people were reportedly 
killed 
Source: compiled by Ugwueze, (2014: 12-19) Ugwueze, Michael I. (2014) The United States National Interests 
and the Fight against Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria. Unpublished. 
Meanwhile, whatever explanations that may be adduced, it is our reasoned contention that Boko Haram 
remains autochthonous terrorist group sponsored by disaffected and disgruntled political notables from largely 
the northern extraction who are determined to sustain their acclaimed ‘inalienable rights’ to rule since according 
to them they are ‘born to rule’. They mask their intentions on religion but their mission remains to 
institutionalize northern hegemony on the polity. The ferocious attacks of the sect on the helpless and hapless 
masses remain unprecedented, coordinated and tenacious. 
 
Conclusion/Prognosis 
The paper examined the inherent politics of securitization in Nigeria. It explored the interface between 
securitization and the menace of Boko Haram insurgence while outlining the impact of the insurgency on the 
Nigerian State. Against this backdrop, we conclude as follows: 
• That unhealthy rivalry between politicians from the southern and northern divide has tended to 
securitize virtually all issues associated with governance. 
• The desperation, disagreement and growing intolerance among the political class on the distribution and 
appropriation of commonwealth has reduced all government policies and actions to suspicion and 
misinterpretation, thereby securitizing political actions and counter-actions. 
• The securitization of political transition has further widened the scope of dissent among members of the 
same political party (Peoples Democratic Party – PDP) who agreed to pursue their respective 
irreconcilable ambitions from two overlapping fronts – the PDP and the All Peoples Congress (APC) 
and yet they remain in one umbrella, the PDP. 
• The seemingly slow or inaction of the Federal Government to declare full state of emergency and deal 
decisively with the insurgents is a further demonstration of the securitization of politics. 
• The securitization of the process of dealing with the insurgents over the Chibok kidnappings has further 
exposed the lacuna inherent in the management of security in Nigeria. It has also exposed the lack of 
inter-agency coordination among the security agencies. 
• The seemingly free passage in the landscape enjoyed by the insurgents is a further demonstration of 
internal complicity within the rank and file of the law enforcement agencies as well as tacit 
collaboration with the civil society. 
• The politicization of security rather than reduce actual threats will rather elevate potential threats to 
constant normative variable that reproduce actual threats. 
• Finally, the constant securitization of politics will deepen centrifugal forces and if not checked shall 
lead to violent dismemberment of the polity. 
Arising from the foregoing, we recommend as follows: 
1. That as a practical step to reduce securitization, good governance rooted in the will of the governed 
should be institutionalised. 
2. A unique confederation designed to encourage separate production and distribution values should be 
agreed upon and specified percent of productions royalties should be remitted to the central government 
which must exist for coordination of foreign relations and nothing more. Representatives of such 
‘clearing’ polity (government) must be equitably distributed among the geopolitical zones and a system 
of rotation must be entrenched to support political transition. 
3. Law enforcement agencies should be recruited based on the constituent geo-political zones and must 
include only indigenes of these respective zones. Local content utilization must be enforced to avert the 
ongoing sabotage and seeming mutiny being experienced during the prosecution of anti-insurgent 
measures. 
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